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WHAT FUTURE FOR THE CORPORATE TAX IN THE NEW CENTURY? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 It has long been recognised that the corporate tax suffers from several inherent 
deficiencies.  However, in recent years, the transformation and integration of the world 
economy has exacerbated and highlighted these weaknesses, placing a question mark over the 
future of the tax.  Through an examination of the problems besetting the tax today, a critical 
analysis of the conventional justifications for it, and a review of economic and political factors 
relevant to its continued existence, this article considers its future in the new century.  
 
 Five main criticisms of the tax are identified.  First, allocating profit between tax 
jurisdictions is becoming increasingly problematic.  Second, it is poorly equipped to adapt to 
new forms of commerce.  Third, because of the existence of international tax differentials, it 
distorts the optimum allocation of global investment.  Fourth, it distorts the capital structures of 
companies.  Finally, it is increasingly inequitable.   
 
 Theoretical justifications for the tax are unconvincing.  Its continued existence is more 
likely due simply to the importance of its revenues to government and political obstacles to its 
abolition. 
 
 The main present threat to the tax’s existence is its possible repeal in an important 
economy such as the US, subsequent to which smaller countries may have no choice but to 
follow suit.  A further threat is that increased tax competition may reduce the comparative 
importance of corporate tax revenues to governments.  This, together with likely increased 
costs of compliance and enforcement, may eventually force governments to reconsider the 
merits of retaining the tax. 
 
 
Classification codes: H25 Business Taxes, F02 International Economic Order 
 
Keywords: corporate taxation; tax revenues; tax competition 
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WHAT FUTURE FOR THE CORPORATE TAX IN THE NEW CENTURY? 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The taxation of corporate income (“the corporate tax”) is a widespread source of 
government revenue; today, in one form or another, it forms part of the tax systems of nearly 
all developed nations.  However, in recent years, it has come increasingly under attack.  To 
long-standing criticisms of the tax purely in a domestic context have been added more recent 
complaints that it is ill adapted to a world economy that is becoming increasingly integrated 
and influenced by technological change.  
 
Recent developments have combined to make the world a smaller place.  In particular, 
advancing globalisation and the advent of electronic commerce have increased the 
interdependency of individual economies.  This has brought with it an increased awareness of 
the need to formulate new sets of rules on an international basis to govern the new global 
environment.  In some areas of international taxation, admirable progress has been made, for 
example on the use of tariffs and subsidies in the trade area.  However, by contrast, 
comparatively little has been done to regulate corporate taxation.  This lack of international 
co-ordination is at the heart of many of the problems besetting the tax today. 
 
In view of recent global developments, the purpose of this paper is to critically review 
the current role and functions of the corporate tax, and, in this light, to consider its future.  
Indeed, a more basic question is considered of whether the tax can, or should, survive in the new 
century.  While recently all taxes have, to one extent or another, been subject to pressures of 
change in fast-transforming domestic and global environments, these pressures have been 
applied most intensely to the corporate tax, since the corporate domain has been largely at the 
forefront of economic and technological changes.  The future of the corporate tax is, then, 
important in the broader issue of how the structure of individual countries’ tax systems, and of 
the international tax system, might evolve in future.   
 
The paper is divided into five further sections. The next section considers recent 
criticisms of the tax, and why these have become more pronounced in recent years.  The paper 
then discusses why, in spite of these complaints, the tax remains widely in use.  Section 3 
analyses the more conventional justifications put forward for the tax’s existence while section 4 
considers further explanations for its durability.  The future of the tax is discussed in section 
5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE CORPORATE TAX UNDER ATTACK 
 
Recent economic, political and technological developments have provoked renewed 
criticisms of the corporate tax.  These criticisms are now outlined in turn. 
 
a. Allocational Issues Across Jurisdictional Boundaries 
 
When companies operate in more than one taxing jurisdiction, the question is raised of 
how to allocate the profits raised between those jurisdictions.  In particular, policies and 
practices need to be established on how to charge transfers of physical goods, services and 
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intangible property between business units within a multinational group (transfer pricing).  Over 
time, an international consensus has been built up, establishing the “arm’s-length principle” for 
transfer pricing, i.e. that intra-group transactions should be priced as though they were being 
transacted by independent persons.  This international consensus culminated in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations in the mid-
1990s, since when they have been regularly updated. 
 
This consensus is now under great strain, for several reasons.  First, the sheer volume of 
international intra-firm transactions is providing an enormous challenge to the regulatory efforts 
of national tax authorities.1  Second, the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
becoming more integrated.  When the various functions involved in international operations (for 
example, trading, risk-management, funding, marketing, administration, etc.) need to be factored 
into transaction prices, traditional methods of ascertaining these prices are no longer adequate 
(see Doernberg and Hinnekens, 1999).  Third, MNEs are becoming more service-oriented, and 
are relying more on intangibles such as brands and intellectual property to create wealth.  These 
are difficult to price.  Finally, as mentioned by Owens (1993), these highly integrated companies 
are increasingly able to take advantage of economies of scale, making price comparisons with 
unrelated parties increasingly inappropriate. 
 
Because of these developments, the arm’s-length consensus is now in danger of breaking 
down.  If it does so, the world may be left with what many consider to be a second-best 
alternative, such as the unitary or arbitrary formula approach to income allocation, or indeed no 
consensus at all.2 
 
 
b. Problems Posed by Electronic Commerce 
 
Electronic commerce compounds the problem of income allocation mentioned above.  
E-commerce enables MNEs to further integrate their operations, making it difficult for tax 
authorities to identify and measure contributions to profit and allocate them to different 
jurisdictions.  This problem is augmented by the often unique features of electronic contributions 
to profit, which make it difficult to determine their economic value.   
 
Further, as mentioned by Warren (2002), the growth of the Internet and of secure global 
company-based intranets has enabled companies to shift profits more easily from one tax 
jurisdiction to another to avoid tax.  The lack of a secure and verifiable audit trail makes it 
difficult for tax authorities to identify transactions and trace where they take place, expanding 
the scope for both tax avoidance and evasion.  
 
The advent of e-commerce creates an even more fundamental problem for the 
administrators of the corporate tax.  Commonly, companies that are held to be resident in a 
country are taxed on their worldwide income.  Non-resident corporations are normally 
subject to tax in that country only if their operations constitute a “permanent establishment” 
there, and then only on domestically-sourced income.  Thus the concepts of residence, 
                                                 
1According to Eden (1998), intra-firm transactions at the international level account for almost fifty percent of 
trade for industrialised countries. 
2Under the unitary approach, the allocation of profits earned in more than one jurisdiction depends not on the 
source of the profits, nor on the residence of the head office, but on the application of a pre-determined formula to 
world profits.  It is widely considered to have serious deficiencies in allocating profits (see for example, Weiner, 
2001).  Conversely, for arguments in support of this approach, see for example Tyson (1996). 
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permanent establishment, and the source of income are essential in the assessment of income 
to tax.  However, with the borderless technology of the Internet significantly reducing the 
relevance of geographical considerations, the above concepts have become increasingly 
obsolete (indeed, the advent of e-commerce puts the entire traditional concept of jurisdiction 
to tax into question).  In particular, there is a growing need for a new international consensus 
on the definition of a permanent establishment.  Any such consensus would likely make the 
definition more complex, and thus possibly easier to avoid.  It has been suggested that the 
location of web servers be used to determine residency or permanent establishment.  
However, servers are geographically very mobile, and can easily be placed in lowest-tax 
locations.   
 
 A final problem that electronic commerce creates for the corporate tax concerns the 
characterisation of income.  A further international consensus has been built in that the nature 
of the income in question determines the extent and form of the tax applied to it.  In 
particular, royalty income is commonly taxed through withholding taxes in the source 
country when the payment is made to the non-resident.  Sales income, on the other hand, is 
normally taxed as profits in the country where the seller is resident or has a permanent 
establishment.  Electronic commerce blurs the already hazy distinction between these two 
types of income.  For example, if a digital product is purchased over the Internet, does the 
consideration involved constitute income from sales or is it a royalty from the right to use or 
for the use of the product’s copyright?  The difficulties involved in providing a definitive 
answer to this question allow considerable opportunity for tax avoidance. 
 
 
c. Distortions to the Optimum Global Allocation of Resources  
 
The tax systems of individual countries, almost without exception, have developed 
primarily to address domestic concerns, such as the redistribution of income and wealth, the 
macro-economic stabilisation of the economy, and the allocation of productive resources within 
the economy.  Like any tax, the level at which the corporate tax is imposed in a country is 
therefore a reflection of the political, economic and social realities of that nation.  Thus, as 
corporate taxes were introduced throughout the world, tax differentials between countries 
inevitably materialised.  Although individual countries’ tax systems have always affected and 
been affected by other economies, policy makers usually paid little attention to international tax 
differentials, as their effects were comparatively insignificant.  Now, with the removal of non-
tax barriers to investment and the integration of national economies, and the resultant increase in 
the mobility of international capital, corporate tax differentials are much more consequential, as 
they have an increasingly important role in determining the level and destination of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (see, for example, Ruding, 1992; Baker and MacKenzie, 2001).   
 
 International corporate tax differentials, through their influence on investment 
location decisions, disrupt the optimum allocation of resources and reduce economic 
efficiency.  This misallocation of resources is at the expense of the comparative advantage of 
countries in production and trade (see Ricardo, 1819), and leads to diminished world capital 
productivity and reduced levels of global output.  International corporate tax differentials 
therefore pose an efficiency problem to the world economy as a whole.3   
 
                                                 
3For an alternative view, that tax differentials can be beneficial, see for example Cnossen (1990). 
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 Since this was first recognised as a growing problem, two alternative solutions have been 
put forward.  The first of these maintains that co-ordinated inter-governmental action can 
effectively remove tax differentials by aligning tax levels.  However, while efforts to achieve 
such co-ordination have been made for many years, in particular in the European Union (EU), 
progress has been very slow and, so far, small.  Obstacles to progress are numerous and varied in 
nature, and include, for example, the need to harmonise the level and composition of 
government expenditure as well as taxation if investment distortions are to be removed, the 
economic upheaval involved in coordination to companies and to economies as a whole, and the 
effect of international coordination on the distribution of tax revenues amongst countries.  
Especially important is the jealousy with which individual states cling to their sovereignty on 
matters of taxation (one of the very few areas in EU law where unanimity is required to pass 
legislation).4  
 
According to the second school of thought, co-ordination between governments is not 
necessary, as the problem of tax differentials is self-correcting.  As countries compete for 
investment from overseas, international tax differentials are reduced through a process of 
what has been termed “international tax competition”.  Competitive pressures will force the 
“prices” of investing in countries, i.e. taxes, together.  In other words, countries will 
spontaneously harmonise their tax systems or face the loss of international investment and the 
disadvantages this brings.5  Recent studies suggest that some spontaneous harmonisation is 
indeed taking place.  Using data from nineteen developed economies over the period 1982 to 
2003, Simmons (forthcoming) showed that the dispersion of statutory corporate tax rates fell 
by approximately one-third, while similar results were recorded for effective tax rates.   
 
Nevertheless, recent evidence on effective tax rates (Baker and McKenzie, 2001; 
European Commission, 2001) suggests that international tax differentials currently remain 
high (at least in the EU) and represent a strong incentive for companies to choose the most 
tax-favoured locations for their investments.   If tax competition is reducing distortions to 
investment, it clearly still has some way to go.  Also, there are conceptual problems on 
relying on tax competition to reduce distortions to investment.  As Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1990) argue, there is no clear theoretical backing for the supposition that tax competition 
will eventually result in a more efficient allocation of resources through reducing tax 
differentials.  An equally likely scenario is that tax competition will foster a climate in which 
countries aim to attract capital through being tax-efficient rather than being least-cost 
locations, leading to greater rather than less distortion.  
 
     
d. Distortions to Corporate Capital Structure 
 
 The corporate tax has long been criticised in that it favours one kind of finance 
(interest-paying debt) over another (shareholders’ equity), since debt interest is usually 
deductible in the calculation of taxable profits, whereas dividends are normally not.6  The 
                                                 
4For a further discussion of the many difficulties involved in corporate tax harmonisation in the EU, see for 
example James (2000).  
5These potential disadvantages can nowadays be severe; investment inflows from overseas have been growing in 
significance to the economic health of individual countries.  According to UNCTAD (2001), global inward FDI 
flows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation nearly tripled between 1997 and 1999, rising from 5.9% 
to 16.3%. 
6This distinction brings into question the very nature of the corporate tax base.  Since interest on debt capital is 
deductible, the corporate tax does not represent a tax on the profits of a corporation before taking into account a 
return on capital employed.  But also, since no country currently gives an allowance against tax for a "normal" 
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separate tax treatment of debt and equity capital creates a tax-induced distortion to the 
optimum capital structure of corporations, since the tax confers a benefit onto the raising of 
funds through debt.  This distortion also raises corporate risk, as it increases the chances of 
excessive gearing and bankruptcy. 
 
 More recently, the distinction in the treatment of debt and equity has resulted in artificial 
investment forms that can be classified as debt but have the desired characteristics of equity 
(Cooper and Gordon, 1995).  The difficulties that this situation has created have in recent years 
been exacerbated by the development of derivatives and other financial instruments that make 
the distinction between debt and equity much less clear than in the past.  As Alworth (1998, 
p.512) explains:  
 
“The tax systems of most countries are wont to subdividing transactions into 
particular categories which are then subject to specific provision…Since 
derivatives and other financial instruments allow easy modification of the 
external attributes of financial arrangements (transforming dividends into interest 
payments for example through the lending of securities) these separations have 
become increasingly arbitrary.” 
 
 As a result of these innovations, differences between countries’ tax rules permit wide 
opportunities for international tax arbitrage, for example through benefiting from the treatment 
of a receipt as a dividend in one jurisdiction while deriving a deduction as an interest expense for 
the corresponding payment in another (see Citron, 2002).  
 
 
e. The Corporate Tax and Equity  
 
 There are two issues involved with regard to the fairness of the corporate tax.  The first 
of these concerns the effective incidence of the tax, the second the problem of “double taxation”. 
 
The first issue rests upon the perception that a company per se cannot bear tax: only 
individuals can do so.  Tax on corporate profits will thus ultimately be borne by the 
individual stakeholders in the company.  Customers may bear the tax through an increase in 
the prices they are charged, the extent of the increase depending upon the degree of 
imperfection in competitive conditions.  Employees may bear the tax through a reduction in 
their remuneration or an increase in unemployment, depending on the degree of imperfection 
in the labour market.  Suppliers of capital may suffer the tax due to a reduction in the returns 
they are willing to accept.  However, in a completely open economy, suppliers of capital will 
require the “world rate of return” or they will invest their money elsewhere.  In this scenario, 
the corporate tax cannot reduce investors’ returns below that world rate, but can only lead to 
a decrease in the amount of capital they invest (see Bond et al., 2000, p.23).  Therefore, in a 
small open economy with few barriers to foreign investment, the incidence of the tax is likely 
to be borne completely, or at least more heavily, by providers of labour (and perhaps by 
consumers) than by the suppliers of capital.   In light of recent increases in the international 
mobility of capital, its effect is therefore likely to be increasingly regressive.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
return on equity, the corporate tax cannot be said to capture the "pure" profits of a corporation (that is, its 
income in excess of the remuneration of all factors of production, including capital).  It is therefore not easy to 
define conceptually exactly what the tax seeks to capture.  
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In practice, then, the ultimate incidence of the corporate tax depends on how the tax 
burden levied on corporate profits is redistributed onto their various stakeholders.  As this 
will vary by company, by industry, and by country, depending upon the elasticity of demand 
for the product and the elasticity of supply for capital and labour, the incidence of the tax 
throughout an economy is hard to predict (see Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989).  Although this 
uncertainty is not necessarily inequitable in itself, it is likely to confound government 
attempts to distribute the tax burden in a manner which it considers fair.   
 
A second equity issue concerns the double taxation of income, which is widely 
considered to be inequitable, as it represents “over-taxation”.  Most countries tend to adopt 
tax systems that include taxes on the incomes of both companies and the shareholders of 
those companies.   This leads to either the unfairness of double taxation on distributed profits or 
the necessity to avoid this by introducing technically complicated systems such as imputation. 
 
 Under the “classical” system, currently pertaining in, for example, the USA, company 
profits are taxed at the corporate level and then at the individual level when distributed.  As no 
credit is given to the shareholders for tax suffered at the corporate level, this system results in 
double taxation.  If one sees a company as being merely a conduit for income as it makes its way 
to its owners, then, in principle, there is little justification for taxing distributed profits at the 
corporate level.  From this viewpoint, the corporate tax acts merely as a huge withholding tax on 
distributions, collectable at a convenient stage for the government.   
 
  Imputation systems represent one common way of relieving double taxation.  Under 
these systems, part or all of the corporate tax charged on dividends is imputed to shareholders 
against their personal income tax liability on such dividends.  However, the growing 
international dispersion of share ownership has accentuated a deficiency of these systems.  A 
fully neutral treatment of investment income requires that countries not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign shareholders by denying to the latter the tax credit that the imputation 
system provides.  Nonetheless, in practice there is a natural strong reluctance to grant foreign 
shareholders the tax credit, as it would have to be given by a different tax authority from the one 
levying the corporate tax.  Thus imputation systems disfavour the foreign ownership of share 
capital.  In times when the ownership of corporations was mostly domestic, this aspect of 
imputation did not constitute a major problem.  Now, with the diffusion of share ownership 
throughout the world, the inequity of this situation is more apparent.  In the EU, the European 
Court of Justice has recently ruled this aspect of imputation incompatible with single market 
freedoms.7   This has resulted in some countries, for example Ireland, moving away from 
imputation back to the classical system, with its attendant double taxation implications for 
shareholders in those countries. 
 
 As the above analysis suggests, recent economic and technological developments 
have transpired to accentuate and draw attention to the inherent weaknesses of the corporate 
tax.   In light of this, it is useful to review the justifications that have been traditionally put 
forward for the tax.  These are identified and critically analysed in the following section. 
 
 
                                                 
7The Metallgesellschaft Case (C-397/98) and the Hoechst Case (C-410/98), 2000 (joined cases). 
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3. EMERGENCE OF AND CONVENTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 
CORPORATE TAX 
 
The first taxes on corporate income were introduced by individual states of the USA in 
the mid-19th century.  In the early years of the following century, many countries began a 
process of moving away from their traditional indirect tax base towards direct taxation.  A 
federal tax on corporate profits was introduced in the USA in 1909 and, as a war-time measure, 
in the UK in 1915, where it represented an additional tax on company profits to that already 
imposed upon individuals’ income from capital.  The tax then spread rapidly to other nations, 
until today it is almost universally applied in the developed world.  
 
The original rationale for the introduction of the new tax was that companies were, as 
they are now, separate legal entities from their owners (whose liability is limited to the sums 
they invest in the enterprise), with the right of perpetual independent existence, and the right 
to sue and be sued (Oates, 2002).  Thus if individual persons were subject to taxation on their 
income, it was considered reasonable that corporate persons should also be so. From the 
outset, then, a separate corporate tax was felt to be justified in that it was perceived as the price 
to pay for the privilege of incorporation with limited liability. 
 
However, it is not clear why being granted the legal privilege of limited liability is an 
appropriate justification for the taxation of company profits, or, more specifically, why the 
benefits of incorporation should be thus considered proportional to those profits (see, for 
example, Kay and King, 1991).  It has been suggested that a licence fee would be more 
appropriate (Krever, 1985; James and Nobes, 2003).  Indeed, the first business income taxes 
mentioned earlier evolved from licenses and were flat fees.  In any case, it can be argued that 
incorporation already comes with a price: in the statutory audit and information dissemination 
requirements. 
 
 A further rationale for the corporate tax is that, as it gives the government more 
flexibility with regard to fiscal policy, it is potentially useful as an additional tool in macro-
economic stabilisation.  Indeed, this role may even have strengthened recently in some 
countries, as a result of restrictions on the use of alternative stabilisation strategies.8  However, 
it has long been recognised that corporate tax policy is something of a blunt, and slow-acting, 
instrument with which to regulate the economy.  Not only is it subject to the usual time lags 
involved in fiscal policy, but it is also normally collected well in arrears (James and Nobes, 
2003).  Also, the corporate tax is nowadays less suited to a role as a domestic macro-economic 
stabiliser than, say, the individual income tax, since its level is highly influenced by tax levels 
overseas due to competition for mobile capital. 
 
 It is also argued that the tax prevents the possibility of individuals shifting their 
earned personal income into corporate income, thus avoiding tax.  Securing government 
revenue in this way would, on the face of it, appear to be an important function of the 
corporate tax.  Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) go as far as to say that 
 
                                                 
8In the EU, monetary union and the use of a common currency have meant that to a large extent many member 
states have surrendered their ability to control their economies through exchange rate and monetary policy.  This is 
on top of earlier surrender of control over tariff and trade policy. 
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“…the primary role of the corporate tax appears to be as a backstop to the 
personal tax on labour income rather than as a tax on the return to capital 
invested in the corporate sector.” 
 
However, the type of tax avoidance activity mentioned above can and has been successfully 
countered in several countries through the introduction of specific anti-avoidance provisions, 
although such legislation necessarily complicates the tax system.9  At any rate, to rest the 
case for an entire tax on the inability of another to counter abuse is less than convincing. 
 
 The underlying argument here for the corporate tax is that, in its absence, while the 
individual income tax system would capture corporate income distributed as dividends, 
retentions would remain untaxed.  It is true that in practice no country attempts to fully 
impute corporate profits to shareholders.10  However, retained profits can be, and commonly 
are, taxed in other ways.  For example, capital gains taxes (or, eventually, death duties) 
eventually capture retained profits through the increase in the capital value of the shares upon 
disposal (or death).  Thus this argument for the tax is merely that it prevents the deferral (as 
opposed to the avoidance) of the tax liability on retained profits.   
 
 It is further argued that the tax gives those countries receiving inward investment 
(“host” or “source” countries) the ability to tax corporate income originating on their 
territory, even (and especially) if the corporation is foreign-owned.  In its absence, the 
income of foreign shareholders would not be captured by the domestic tax system.  The 
international tax system has over the years evolved whereby the right to tax active business 
income is given primarily, or at least first, to the host country (by contrast, the right to tax 
passive, non-business income is normally granted to the residence country).  This role of the 
corporate tax would be especially important in capital-importing countries such as Australia 
and Canada (Oates, 2002).  The recent overall rise in the importance of FDI to the health of 
individual economies has arguably made this rationale for the tax of greater significance.11 
 
 Certainly, the host country has a reasonable claim to tax company profits originating 
on its territory, since it is providing cost-reducing services to the corporate sector.  Examples 
of these are the provision of infrastructure, the basic education of the workforce, or the 
provision of security through police force and armed services.  But does this justify the 
existence of the corporate tax?  It is difficult to discern a clear relationship between the 
benefits to a company of public services and the corporate taxes that the company pays.  
Also, the host country is likely to gain from foreign investment in ways other than tax 
revenue, such as the creation of employment for the local population.  Perhaps most 
importantly, there are alternatives to the corporate tax; the host country government can, and 
usually does, take its “cut” from the profits of the foreign-owned company through other 
means, such as withholding taxes on dividends and other transfers overseas, excise duties or 
payroll taxes. 
 
 Taken as a whole, then, the conventional theoretical arguments in favour of the 
corporate tax would not appear to be entirely convincing, suggesting the existence of further 
reasons for its durability.  These are considered in the next section. 
 
                                                 
9Examples include “service company” legislation in Hong Kong. 
10An exception to this is the system for “S” Corporations in the US, where a partnership election for certain 
clearly defined companies is allowed if all shareholders agree. 
11For an indication of the importance of these flows, see note 5 above. 
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4. REASONS BEHIND THE DURABILITY OF THE CORPORATE TAX 
 
 Two further considerations support the continued existence of the corporate tax: the 
importance of the government revenues it produces and the political difficulties involved in 
its abolition. 
 
   For an understanding of the importance of corporate tax revenues to governments, these 
revenues are displayed as a percentage of total tax revenues and of GDP in Table 1 below.  The 
table shows these percentages at five-year intervals from 1980 to 2000 and for 2002 for the 
fifteen (pre-enlargement) EU member states as a whole (EU15), and for the OECD as a 
whole. 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 
 For the EU15, tax revenues from corporate profits as a percentage of total tax revenues 
rose from 5.8% in 1980 to 8.6% in 2002, an increase of nearly one half.  For the OECD, the 
percentage also rose, from 7.6% to 9.3%, an increase of approximately one-quarter.  Tax 
revenues from corporate profits as a percentage of GDP show a similar story, with the increases 
for the EU15 and OECD being roughly two-thirds and two-fifths respectively.   In all cases, the 
increases were continuous between 1980 and 2000, with a small decrease being recorded 
between 2000 and 2002. 
 
 Corporate tax revenues thus in general constitute a significant, and (at least until 
recently) increasing, proportion of total tax revenues and GDP.  Abolishing the corporate tax 
would, then, deprive governments of a useful source of revenue, and thus is likely to be strongly 
resisted.  In some individual countries, this proportion is far larger than the EU or OECD 
averages, such as for Luxembourg (20.5% of total revenues and 8.6% of GDP in 2002) and 
for Australia (16.8% and 5.3%).  The abolition of the tax would likely meet with even firmer 
resistance in these countries.  
 
 Revenues from the corporate tax are important today for another reason.  Many 
developed economies, in particular Japan and certain Western European states, currently face 
intensifying budgetary crises due to a rapid ageing of these countries’ populations.  This 
phenomenon is leading to difficulties for governments in fulfilling their public retirement 
promises and to increases in health and social care spending.  At the same time, countries’ tax 
bases are being reduced, as the population of working age declines.  Other issues that will put 
pressure on governments for increased public expenditure include environmental concerns 
and, more recently, measures to counter terrorism.  It would be extremely difficult in times of 
present and future budgetary exigency to convince governments that a major source of public 
revenue should be discontinued.   This is in spite of the fact that if the tax were abolished, 
governments would likely recoup at least some of this foregone revenue through subsequent 
increases in receipts from capital gains taxes (through increases in share prices) and personal 
income taxes (through increased dividend income).  Corporate investment is also likely to be 
enhanced, with subsequent indirect benefits for the government exchequer, through, for 
example, greater employment.   
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 A second reason for the tax’s longevity is its degree of support from the general 
population.  Such support rests on the belief that it redistributes income within society, since 
the tax is seen as being borne by shareholders who are, in general, more affluent than those 
who do not own shares.   However, there are problems with this belief.  Share ownership has 
become more diffused across society, at least in developed countries, and is now hardly the 
sole province of the rich.  Further, the redistributional consequences of the corporate tax may 
well be misperceived.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the effective incidence of the tax may 
now fall more on labour (through lower wages and/or unemployment) and consumers 
(through higher prices) than on the owners of capital.  Nonetheless, it is likely that this 
transfer of the tax burden is not fully appreciated by the general public.  The corporate tax is 
therefore to some extent “hidden”, and as such is comparatively attractive to governments 
who, sensitive to the views of their electorate in matters of taxation, have always been keen to 
“pluck the goose with the least amount of hissing”.    
 
Also, to the person in the street, it appears reasonable to tax corporations. They 
benefit from public expenditure, such as the provision of infrastructure. They are entities that 
have an important effect on society and on the lives of individual citizens.  Indeed, 
companies, especially multinational enterprises, are seen by some as being overly powerful 
and answerable to no one.  Further, as the tax has been a part of nearly all developed 
economies for many years, its existence today is widely taken for granted.  In addition to 
these existing preconceptions, the abolition of the tax would certainly result in windfall gains 
for those who bought shares at prices that at the time reflected the expectation of the 
continued existence of the tax.  It is likely that these gains would not be widely appreciated 
by the general public.  Thus, the tax’s removal is likely today to appear unacceptable, if not 
perverse, to a large section of the electorate.    
 
 In sum, revenue considerations and political risk-avoidance are likely to be decisive 
factors in any individual government’s decision as to whether to retain the corporate tax.  
Indeed, to date, no government that has introduced the tax has ever repealed it.   
 
 
5. THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATE TAX 
 
  The above analysis suggests that recent criticisms of the corporate tax have been 
heightened by the increased interdependency of nations’ economies.  Any effective solution 
would thus require an orchestrated international response.  A radical solution that has been 
put forward is the worldwide abolition of the tax.12  Certainly, such a bold international 
initiative would remove at a stroke most of the concerns referred to above.  However, given 
the economic and political difficulties confronting any individual government’s attempt to 
repeal the tax, and in light of the unsuccessful attempts at international co-ordination of 
corporate taxes to date (after all, worldwide abolition represents an extreme form of co-
ordination), any solution along these lines must, in anything but the long term, be considered 
remote. 
 
Nonetheless, it might well be the case that if a major participant in the world economy 
decided to take it upon itself to be the first to abolish the tax, others may be willing to follow 
                                                 
12The Economist Newspaper has consistently advocated abolition of the tax.  See, for example, in the Economist, 
“Taxes for Corporate Europe”, 21st March 1992, and “Time to Hiss: A Bad Tax whose Time has Gone”, 31st 
January 2004.  Abolition of the tax has been considered in the past in several individual countries, for example 
in the UK by the Meade Committee (Meade, 1978).  
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suit.  This would more likely be the case if the move resulted in attracting significant amounts of 
investment away from them and reducing the viability of their own corporate tax regimes.  It is 
of course highly likely that in such a scenario the “first mover” would be very attractive as a 
haven to park paper profits. 
 
 There are currently two potential candidates for the role of first mover: the EU and the 
US.  Take first the EU.  A central feature of the EU’s approach to economic integration has, 
since its founding, been the principle that the allocation of productive resources should not be 
distorted by the actions or policies of individual governments.  The abolition of corporate 
taxation would certainly represent a complete, albeit radical, solution to such distortion.13  While 
the EU thus has a clear incentive to abolish the tax within its borders, there are serious practical 
obstacles to this becoming a reality.   The EU is of course composed of individual states, each, 
as mentioned earlier, with its own veto on matters relating to taxation, and so the seemingly 
intractable problems mentioned earlier in obtaining agreement would apply.  The failure of all 
the European Commission’s proposals to date on the approximation of corporate taxes in the EU 
attest to the very low likelihood of their abolition within that bloc. 
  
 The US is a potential first mover simply because the debate in that country is at a more 
advanced stage than elsewhere.  As alternatives to the present corporate income tax, two variants 
of an expenditure tax were heavily promoted within the US Congress during the 1980s and 
1990s, although neither reached the statute books.  The debate shows no signs of flagging.  In 
March to June 2004, the House Majority Leader made a series of speeches in Congress on 
radical tax reform, including the idea of a national sales tax to replace the corporate tax.  The 
high level at which the debate is continuing in the US suggests that if any worldwide movement 
to eliminate the corporate tax is forthcoming, it is most likely to originate in that country.  
 
  Notwithstanding the above, the demise of the corporate tax seems unlikely in the 
foreseeable future.  How then is it likely to evolve in the 21st century?  One likely 
development is that costs of tax enforcement and compliance will continue to rise.  In recent 
years, the complexity of enforcement and compliance has increased dramatically, in particular 
concerning cross-border investment, with transfer pricing and controlled foreign company 
(CFC) anti-avoidance provisions being introduced in several countries and strengthened in 
others.  Such developments are likely to further increase costs in terms of personnel and time 
for both companies and tax administrators.   
 
 A consequence of these pressures is that in future tax authorities may be more 
amenable to international measures aimed at improving international exchanges of 
information.  In this regard, new communications technology, often viewed with trepidation 
by tax administrators, may become an important ally.  Progress in international information 
exchange has already been made.  The OECD has issued a Model Agreement on Information 
Exchange (OECD, 2002) which strengthens exchange of information powers over those 
traditionally contained in bilateral tax treaties.  Also, tax havens, under pressure from 
developed country institutions such as the OECD and the EU (see discussion on tax 
competition below), have, apart from a few recalcitrants, agreed to reduce their traditional 
reliance on secrecy and to exchange information with developed nations under certain 
conditions.14 
                                                 
13For discussions on the abolition of the corporate tax in the context of the European Union, see for example 
Devereux and Pearson (1989) and Gammie (2001).   
14 All but five tax havens have now committed to cooperate with the OECD with regard to improving 
transparency and information sharing.  For a history of this OECD initiative, see, for example, Spencer (2004).  
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 Developments have also taken place in response to the need for an increasingly co-
ordinated response to the problem of allocating income between jurisdictions.  In 1990, the 
EU instituted its Arbitration Convention, which provides an independent mechanism for 
resolving transfer pricing disputes that result in double taxation.  This could well be used as a 
model for international arbitration in a more global sphere.  Also, the use of Advance Pricing 
Agreements (APAs), in which MNEs and relevant tax authorities agree in advance on transfer 
pricing methodology, has been rapidly expanding in recent years.  This process is likely to 
continue.  Looking further into the future, there is currently discussion of the establishment of 
a World Tax Organisation on the lines of the World Trade Organisation, which would, 
amongst other roles, provide a forum for the arbitration of international tax disputes (see for 
example, Sawyer, 2004). 
 
 The above developments notwithstanding, the future of the tax will more 
fundamentally depend on whether it can continue to justify its existence in terms of 
generating government revenues.  As shown above, these revenues have been maintained, 
and have even increased, in recent years.  But will this continue to be the case in future?   
 
In the last quarter of a century, corporate tax reform has been characterised by a 
decrease in statutory tax rates in many countries (see for example Singleton, 1999; Wunder, 
1999; Devereux et al., 2002). This has been due to important trends in politics and 
economics, such as the election of more “business-friendly” governments and the associated 
movement towards supply-side economics that has encouraged reductions in marginal tax 
rates to boost productivity.  It has also likely been due to increased international tax 
competition for investment and paper profits. 
 
Table 2 shows movements in statutory tax rates and a commonly used measure of 
effective tax rates, the Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)15 at 10-year intervals from 1983 
to 2003.  The table shows data for selected countries and the average for nineteen OECD 
countries (comprising the G7, all pre-enlargement EU member states excluding Denmark and 
Luxembourg, plus Australia, Norway and Switzerland).  The data are provided by the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS).16 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
  
 Statutory tax rates decreased markedly in most countries between 1983 and 1993.  
This steep decline reflects the flurry of tax reform that took place in the late 1980s, following the 
first moves to reduce rates in the UK and the US.  The more moderate falls (and, in some cases 
slight increases) between 1993 and 2003 reflect a period of comparative consolidation in most 
countries, although France and Germany are still in the throes of their corporate tax reforms.   
Between 1983 and 2003, the average rate for the nineteen OECD countries fell from 48% to 
33%, a drop of nearly one-third.  In that period, seventeen out of the nineteen countries reduced 
their rates, while only two increased theirs.    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
The OECD regularly issues Progress Reports on its initiative.  For the latest of these, see OECD (2004). 
15The EMTR represents the tax rate that applies to a marginal investment project, i.e. it summarises the impact that 
taxes have on a project that just earns the minimum required rate of return after tax. 
16Data available online from the IFS at www.ifs.org.uk. 
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 Effective tax rates followed a similar pattern to movements in statutory rates, falling 
markedly between 1983 and 1993, and then more moderately (or in some cases rising 
slightly) between 1993 and 2003.  Over the entire period, the average rate fell from 28% to 
20%, a drop of nearly one-third.  Of the nineteen countries, fourteen showed a decrease in their 
EMTRs, while five showed an increase.   
 
 It is likely that tax rates will in general continue to fall.  Non-tax barriers to overseas 
investment will likely further decline, especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, increasing the 
mobility of capital and forcing further competitive reductions in tax rates.  As a recent 
example of this process, most former Soviet-bloc countries that have entered the EU have 
been active in reducing their tax rates to attract investment.  Poland, Hungary and Latvia have 
all cut their rates to below twenty percent, well below the levels pertaining in most pre-
enlargement member states.  In line with trends in corporate tax policy in Eastern Europe, 
Russia recently announced its implementation of a “flat tax” at a rate of a mere thirteen 
percent. 
 
 At one stage, it seemed that corporate tax competition might be curbed through the 
development of international initiatives aimed at outlawing harmful tax practices.  When the 
OECD unveiled its recent project against harmful tax competition (OECD, 1998), the criteria 
employed for identifying harmful tax practices included a country’s effective tax rate.  
However, this initiative no longer targets overall tax levels.  After pressure from within its 
own committees, and notably from the Bush administration in the US which made its support 
for some degree of tax competition clear, the OECD refocused its project away from tax 
competition towards the exchange of information to counter tax evasion.   
 
 In similar vein, and at around the same time, the EU unveiled its own package to 
tackle harmful tax competition (European Commission, 1997).  The package included a Code 
of Conduct for Business Taxation whereby member states undertook to avoid tax measures 
that constitute harmful tax competition such as incentives that apply only to non-residents, or 
the “ring-fencing” of tax regimes.  Under the Code, however, cuts in the general level of 
corporate taxation pertaining in a country are viewed as not constituting harmful tax 
competition.  Such a view arguably makes this kind of tax cutting more likely, leading to the 
prospect of a “race to the bottom” with regards to overall tax rates, which could severely 
damage revenues (see Keen, 2001). 
 
 Up to now, the impact on tax revenues of falls in tax rates has tended to be mitigated 
somewhat by a concurrent expansion in nations’ tax bases (see for example Lee and 
McKenzie, 1989; Collins and Shakelford, 1996).  This has been achieved through, for 
example, the phasing out of investment credits, a reduction in accelerated depreciation, and 
attempts at tax exportation by tightening up of transfer pricing and controlled foreign 
company legislation.  However, this tax base expansion cannot occur indefinitely.  At some 
point, if tax competition continues to push tax rates downwards, this process will inevitably 
impact upon government revenues.   
 
 Corporate tax revenues have up to now also been supported by improvements in 
corporate productivity that have led to an increase in the relative size of the corporate sector 
HKIBS/WPS/061-056                                                                       14 
 
in many nations, such as the UK.17  This suggests that the increase in corporate tax revenues 
may be explained by reference to the Laffer curve, the bell-shaped curve that explains that there 
is an optimum rate of tax at which maximum government revenue is yielded.  At rates lower 
than this optimum, revenues will increase due to a combination of the incentive effect of the 
lower tax rate on corporate activity and a decrease in the incentive to avoid or evade taxation.  If, 
as is now widely believed, tax rates were on the “wrong” or inverse portion of the curve before 
the tax reforms of the early 1980s, then this would explain the subsequent reductions in tax rates 
being accompanied by increases in corporate tax revenues.    
 
 The future direction of corporate tax revenues is likely therefore to depend largely upon 
whether the deleterious effects on government revenues of reductions in tax rates will continue 
to be offset by the revenue enhancing consequences of improved corporate productivity, 
investment and the expansion of the corporate sector; that is, upon whether tax rates still 
currently dwell on the inverse portion of the curve.  Lower tax rates might also reduce the 
incentive for international tax avoidance and evasion, although increased opportunities for such 
activities are likely to mitigate against this. 
 
 Ultimately, however, the extent to which tax revenues will wither depends largely on 
whether voters see a greater value in maintaining taxes at a comparatively high level, with, 
presumably, an accompanying high level of public investment, or in allowing tax competition 
to lower tax levels to encourage private investment.  In other words, it may rest on the future 
political persuasions of electorates as to the extent to which they accept market forces or 
government involvement as the main driving force for change.  It is also likely to depend 
upon the extent to which governments are able to find alternative sources of tax revenue.  
While limitations of space restrict a broad discussion of the future of other taxes, a few brief 
comments may be useful here.   
 
 Taxes on the income of individuals have until recently been comparatively immune to 
competitive pressures, since, for reasons of family ties, language, rules of professional 
association, etc., the individual income tax base is normally much less internationally mobile 
than the corporate one.  However, its mobility is undoubtedly growing, especially within blocs 
such as the EU.  This means that in future, governments may find that tax revenues from this 
source may well be curtailed through tax competition.  The same may well be true of 
consumption or expenditure taxes, at least in the case of small countries with close borders, and 
in view of the fact that purchasing over borders has been facilitated by Internet technology.  In 
any case, the ability of governments to tax expenditure in many countries seems to have reached 
a ceiling, especially in Europe where VAT rates find themselves close to the limits of their 
political acceptance.  In light of these limitations, tax authorities may in future find themselves 
looking more to the most immobile of tax bases, property, as a source of revenue.  Further 
sources of revenue may be found in newer forms of taxation, such as “green” taxes, which are 
likely to find increasing acceptance with the sensibilities of electorates as concerns about the 
environment rise.  These taxes have already made a significant impact on the structure of tax 
revenues in many developed countries. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                                 
17
 Some countries, having competed aggressively for foreign investment through reductions in corporate tax 
rates, have also gained significant corporate tax revenues from their expanded stock of overseas capital.  Ireland 
is a case in point here.  
 
 HKIBS/WPS/061-056 15 
 
 As the world economy continues to transform and integrate, the problems posed by 
the existence of the corporate tax have intensified and become more exposed.   These trends 
are likely to continue in future.   
 
In spite of these challenges, the corporate tax is likely to survive in some form, at least 
for the foreseeable future.  Today it represents a long-established, significant and welcome 
source of revenue for governments.  It can be collected from an easily identifiable source, and 
is widely seen as justified by the general public.  As Gammie (1991, p.9) succinctly put it:  
 
“Perhaps the most persuasive reason for retaining a separate tax on profits is not 
only that we do, but that we can.”   
 
 Worldwide abolition is unlikely in the foreseeable future as it would require 
international tax co-ordination on a scale that has not been in evidence to date.  A more 
possible scenario is that a major economy such as the US would take the lead in abolishing 
the tax, in which case smaller countries would a strong incentive (or have no choice but) to 
follow its lead. 
 
 Even in the absence of such a move, if competitive pressures reduce the corporate 
tax’s importance to government revenues and compliance and enforcement costs continue to 
rise, governments may eventually be forced to reconsider the merits of retaining the tax.  
Whether this scenario will eventually materialise depends largely on uncertain future trends 
in economic and political direction and the ability of governments to identify and exploit 
alternative sources of revenue. 
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Table 1 
 
EU15 and OECD Revenues from Corporate Taxation as a Percentage of  
Total Tax Revenues (TTR) and as a Percentage of GDP (1980-2002)  
 
                     EU15                 OECD 
  
      %TTR      %GDP               %TTR    %GDP 
   
1980 5.8     2.1  7.6     2.4 
1985 6.4     2.6  8.0     2.7 
1990 6.8     2.6 7.9     2.7 
1995 6.9     2.7  8.0     2.9 
2000 9.2     3.8  9.7     3.6 
2002 8.6  3.5  9.3 3.4 
 
  Source: OECD Revenue Statistics (2005) 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Corporate Taxes: Statutory1 and Effective Marginal Tax Rates (EMTRs)2 
OECD Selected Countries (ten year intervals, 1983-2003) 
 
 Statutory Rates EMTRs 
 
 1983 1993 2003 1983 1993 2003 
 % % % % % % 
 
 Australia 50 33 30 32 21 24 
 Belgium 45 39 34 31 26 22 
Canada 44 35 36 16 25 25 
 France 50 33 35 26 18 22 
Germany 63 58 40 43 38 30 
 Japan 55 51 41 42 38 29 
 Portugal 55 40 33 48 24 19 
 USA 50 39 39 22 24 24 
 
OECD 19 (mean) 48 36 33 28 23 20 
 
Notes:       
 
1) Statutory rates are on undistributed profits.  For individual countries where the tax rate depends on the type of 
industry, the manufacturing rate is used.  The rate includes local taxes (or average across regions) where they 
exist.  Supplementary taxes are included only if they apply generally. 
 
2) EMTRs calculated on the following assumptions: investment is in plant and machinery, financed by equity or 
retained earnings; depreciation at 12.5%; common inflation rate of 3.5%; real interest rate at 10%; no personal 
taxes. 
 
Source: IFS 
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